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Introduction for:
COLEMAN
Americans have always been somewhat skeptical of
politicians and the government.

A healthy skepticism helps keep

the government accountable to the people and is a part of our
political heritage.

But in recent years, disillusion has

replaced skepticism as people have come to doubt the honesty and
ability of those in the government and other public institutions.
No branch of government is free from this disenchantment.
Attention to scandals like Watergate and Iran-Contra have
redefined the way Americans view the President.

For generations

of Americans, the President was a man of integrity, someone to
look up to.

Recent generations no longer take the President's

integrity for granted.

The Savings and Loan Crisis and the House

Bank check cashing scandal have damaged the peoples' perception
of Congress as well.
The sense of disillusion extends to the legal system as
well.

Several problems create the impression that the legal

system can not deliver justice impartially.

Court congestion,

exacerbated by tight state and federal budgets, delays the
hearing of cases for months, if not years.

Plea bargains and

other discretionary devices used to quickly move cases through
the system attract negative publicity.

Excessive discovery,

uncooperative and combative attorneys, and dubrous billing
practices have created the impression that the bar acts more in
its own interest than that of justice.
Most people who work in the legal system agree that reforms

at all levels are needed.

In his Sennett Lecture, William T.

Coleman, Jr. starts at the top and examines proposals intended to
remedy a longstanding problem facing the Supreme Court: its
excessive caseload.

As Mr. Coleman suggests, the Court's heavy

caseload has repercussions that effect the entire legal system.
Mr. Coleman fears that growth of the Court's caseload has reduced
the quality of some of its opinions.

Should this continue, Mr.

Coleman warns, the Court's authority will erode and its role as
the final arbiter of constitutional disputes will be discounted.
Mr. Coleman's lecture reveals an interesting point: the
Supreme ·court's role in the legal system is not static and has
changed in subtle but important ways.

Mr. Coleman combines his

knowledge of historical efforts to reform the caseload with a
well inf armed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of
contemporary reform proposals.

Unsatisfied with these proposals,

Mr. Coleman uses his Sennett Lecture to make several of his own.
Mr. Coleman's proposals are bold; they reflect his strongly held
belief in the Court's preeminent role in protecting
constitutional rights.
Mr Coleman's lecture will encourage all who question the
efficacy of the legal system.

Mr. Coleman and the other Sennett

Lecturers repeatedly prove that the best and brightest minds are
hard at work to improve the institutions that have protected
liberty and dispensed justice for more than two centuries.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
MANAGING ITS CASELOAD TO ACHIEVE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES
WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, JR.*

INTRODUCTION
In his persistent and innovative efforts to improve the
administration of justice, Chief Justice Burger has invited
public debate about the effect of the Supreme Court's rising
caseload on the quality of judicial decision-making.

1

Because

Justice Holmes once reminded us that justice and high judicial
performance require the company of the bench and the bar acting
in concert,

2

commentary from a practicing member of the bar

seems appropriate.

Thus, in the spirit of the Chief Justice's

invitation this Article will (1) discuss the Supreme Court's

1

Chief Justice Burger, Annual Report on the State of the
Judiciary, 69 AB. A J 442, 446 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Annual Report].
2

Address by Justice Holmes, Suffolk Bar Association Dinner

~~~i~EWiiiMiMiil,Dilif
1

excessive workload,

(2) survey solutions that have been proposed,

primarily by other Justices, and (3) suggest an alternative that
may be more consistent with the Court's historic traditions and
basic constitutional purpose.

This issue transcends the workload

question itself; it goes to the essence of the Supreme Court's
responsibilities during the next two hundred years of our
constitutional democracy.

The solution chosen will affect the

quality of the Court's contribution to efficient but fair justice
and to economic growth with enhanced productivity.

Indeed, it

will determine how successfully the Court can fulfill the
constitutional goal of maximizing, as Justice O'Connor said in
Kolender v. Lawson, "individual freedoms within a framework of
ordered liberty. "

3
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Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983).
2
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I. FACTS AND HISTORY REGARDING SUPREME COURT CASELOAD

A. Statistical Analysis
The increasing burden of the Supreme Court's workload is
5

amply demonstrated by various statistical analyses cited by the
Justices themselves.

7

The Chief Justice, for example, recently

noted that in 1953, the first year of Chief Justice Warren's
tenure, the Court had 1,463 cases on its docket and issued 65
signed opinions.

8

In the Term ending July 1982, the Supreme

Court had 5,311 cases on its docket and issued 141 signed Court
opinions.

9

This amounts to a docket increase of 270 percent

7

Justice Brennan recently noted that during the 1981 Term,
the Supreme Court granted review in 210 cases, which is 26 more
than the Term before and 56 more than two Terms ago."
Brennan,
Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 Judicature 230,

illllllllmtS:
•t111•1••1m•111111
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the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation & the National
Conference of Bar Presidents, at 7 (Feb. 6, 1983) hereinafter
cited as Comments of Justice O'Connor] (available in files of
Fordham Law Review).
8

Annual Report, supra note 1. at 42. "Signed" opinions do
not include concurring, dissenting or per curiam opinions. Id. at
443 n.l; see infra note 17.
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and more than a doubling of signed opinions.

10

In the Term

ending July 6 1983, the Court issued 151 signed opinions.

~;

During Chief Justice Burger's tenure, Congress has created
over one hundred new statutory causes of action.

12

The Court

itself, although to a lesser extent, has also created new causes

12

Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1983, at A12, col. 1.

7

13

of action.

Further evidence of the growing litigiousness of

the American public lies in the number of licensed attorneys,
which has almost doubled since the earl 1970s, and the number of
federal judges, which has increased over the past 30 years from
279 to 647.

14

It is these attorneys and judges who "produce

the
grist for the Supreme Court 'mill',"

15

yet the number of

Supreme
Court Justices has remained at nine since 1869.

16

14

Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1983, at A12, col. 1.

15

Annual Report, supra note 1, at 443.

16

Comments

of

Justice

0' Connor,

supra

note

7,

at

4.

- - · - - -. .111,ltl
8

Other statistics, not as commonly cited, tell a different
story.

There actually has not been an increase over the long

term in the total number of opinions of the Court.

In 1882, for

example, there were 260; in 1932, there were 168; and in 1982,
there were 151.

17

There has been a dramatic increase, however,

in the number of concurring opinions-4 in 1882, 4 in 1932, and 70
in 1982; and the number of dissenting opinions-17 in 1882, 24 in
1932, and 144 in 1982.

18

Stated another way, in 1882, there

were 242 unanimous decisions (93.08 percent of the total); in
1932, there were 133 (79.64 percent of the total); and in 1982,
17

See Appendix, Chart I.

(found at

~-

Ford. L.

Rev~-

(_

_ ,.,,.
r.-....--. .,..
18

See Appendix. Chart I.

(found at

9

there were 34 (22.52 percent of the total).

19

Since the advent

of the Warren Court in 1953, the total number of opinions per
Term, including concurring and dissenting opinions, has risen
from 138 to 361.

20

Dissension among the Justices contributes

to the workload problem not only by spawning separate opinions
but also by inspiring prospective litigants to seek to catapult
concurring or dissenting views into majority opinions.

B. History of Reform
Concern over the Court's workload is as old as the Court

19

See Appendix, Chart I. (found at ????????)

10

itself.

Soon after the Judiciary Act of 1789

21

established a

six-Justice Supreme Court, thirteen single-judge district courts,
and three circuit courts, consisting of one district judge and
two Supreme Court Justices "riding circuit"

22

it became

apparent
that the Court's workload was overwhelming.
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Ch. 20. 1 Stat. 73.

11

Congress' response in subsequent years was to eliminate the
circuit riding duties and increase the size of the Supreme
Court.

24

In 1891, Congress established nine circuit courts of

appeals and did away with the mandatory right of appeal in some
subject areas by introducing the concept of discretionary review
by writ of certiorari.

25

Mandatory review

12

was retained in

only
clearly defined areas.

26

Nevertheless, by the 1923 Term the

Supreme Court was more than one year behind in its docket.

27

This delay was intolerable to Chief Justice Taft, who sponsored a
committee of Justices to draft legislative reforms. 28

With

uncharacteristic speed and without the modern
congressional tendency to engage in "elegant variation," Congress
adopted the Justices draft in the Judges' Bill of 1925.

26

29

The

See supra note 24.

27

Frankfurter & Landis. The Business of the Supreme Court of
the United States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 40
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28

F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra note 22, at 259-60; see
Blumstein. The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals,
Discretionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 Vand. L,. Rev. 895,
898-99 ( 197 3).
29

Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
13

bill further narrowed the mandatory jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to a few categories, including appeals from federal court
decisions holding state statutes unconstitutional or invalid
under federal law or treaties, and state court decisions
upholding state statutes against federal constitutional
attack. 30

The framework established by the Judges' Bill of 1925

persists today, giving the Supreme Court great flexibility in
choosing its cases for review.

For, instead of narrowing the

Court's jurisdiction, Congress chose, in more and more instances,
to delegate to the Court the responsibility for determining which
federal issues are of sufficient national importance to warrant

14

Supreme Court review.

31

The process of issue selection,

therefore, has become an increasingly crucial part of the review
function.

31

See Blumstein, supra note 28, at 903. See supra notes
25-30 and accompanying text.

15

The rising case load, nevertheless, has continued to stimulate
discussion.

34

In 1971, the Chief Justice appointed a

seven-member study committee chaired by Professor Paul Freund of
the Harvard Law School.

The Freund Committee recommended the

establishment of a National Court of Appeals to screen all
certiorari petitions and appeals, referring approximately 400 to
the Supreme Court and denying the rest.

35

Of the cases

referred to it, the Supreme Court would decide either to grant or
deny certiorari, or to remand the case to the National Court of
Appeals for decision.

36

If the National Court of Appeals did

35

Federal Judicial Center, Report
Caseload of the Supreme Court 47 (1972)
Report of the Study Group]. See Freund,
Appeals, 25 Hastings L.J. 1301, 1305-09

16

of the Study Group on the
[hereinafter cited as
A National Court of
(1974).

not refer a case to the Supreme Court, there would be no
procedure by which the Court could review such a decision.

Thus,

had this proposal been adopted, many issues would never have come
to the attention of the Supreme Court in any form, and the choice
of factual context in

which the issues presented to the Court

are reviewed would have been severely restricted.
In 1972, Congress established a commission headed by Roman
Hruska.

This commission also recommended the establishment of a

National Court of Appeals.

37

This proposed National Court,

however, would not have screened certiorari petitions, but rather
would have heard cases referred to it by the Supreme Court or
transferred to it by a court of appeals.

38

The Supreme Court

would thus have been forced to expend its time reviewing which
cases should go to the National Court of Appeals.

The Freund and

Hruska proposals generated a flurry of scholarly comment, both
37

Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System,Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for
Change 5,30 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Recommendations for
Change].
38

~at

32.
17

!;~~:~£I!:: : : :M4was made by the Chief Justice at the American Bar
39

See. e.g., A. Bickel. The Caseload of the Supreme Court and
What, If Anything to do About It (1973): Black, The National
Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 Yale L.J. 883 (1974);
Brennan II, supra note 9; Freund, Why We Need a National Court of
Appeals. 59 A.B.A.J. 247 (1973); Gressman, supra note 27; Warren &
Burger. Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger
Defends Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J.
721 (1973); Composition, Constitutionality, and Desirability, supra
note 9.

18

Association meeting in New Orleans in February of 1983.

The

Chief Justice advocates, as an interim step, the establishment of
a five-year temporary special panel of the new United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The special panel

would have the narrow jurisdiction to decide all inter-circuit
conflicts.

43

Two judges would be designated from each circuit,

creating a pool of twenty-six judges. A panel of seven to nine
judges ould be drawn from the pool for six months to a year to
hear and decide all inter-circuit conflicts and, possibly, a
defined category of statutory interpretation cases.

The panel

could remove 35 to 50 cases a year from the argument calendar of
the Supreme Court, which would, however, retain certiorari
jurisdiction over these cases.

43

44

The Chief Justice views his

Annual Report. supra note 1, at 447.

19

proposal as only an interim and partial solution and, therefore,
further consideration of a permanent national Court of Appeals is
not entirely moot.
In addition to proposals for reform, the Supreme Court has
attempted to alleviate its workload over the last two decades
through self-help measures.

These include shortening the time

for oral argument to half an hour: assigning additional law
clerks to the Justices: dispensing

with records on petitions for

certiorari; and, in some cases, pooling law clerk resources.

45

Despite these efforts, the workload problem persists.
In recent months, most of the Associate Justices have begun to
speak out on the workload problem, offering a variety of
solutions [ .] e1::,: : !.n~:: : : 1:e:11±.&l%nit::::~1,1g:~2;~::~:
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23

Reforms recommended by the Justices and others fall into three
general categories: delegation of Supreme Court authority to
another court to select or decide cases, 61 further statutory
limitations on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or on

~····~
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61

See Annual Report, supra note 1 at 447; Stevens II, supra
note 47,at 182; Recommendations for Change, supra note 37, at
30-39; Report of the Study Group, supra note 35, at 47.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Fix These Cites XXXXXXXXXXXXX
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federal courts in general, 62 and the exercise of greater
judicial restraint and discipline by the Supreme Court itself in
its selection of issues for review.
merit serious study and debate.

63

All three approaches

Emphasis, however,

should be placed on the third, with the addition of a fourth that
will be advanced with great temerity at the end of this Article.
64

The pref erred approaches would concentrate on the

fulfillment of the Supreme Court's constitutional mandate to
construct a legal consensus on a few issues of fundamental
national significance.

62

See Powell, supra note 7, at 1371-72; Comments of
Justice O'Connor, supra note 7, at 141; Remarks of Justice
Rehnquist, supra note 10 at 30.
XXXXXXXXXX Fix these cites XXXXXXXXXXXX

64
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Proposals for an Intermediary Court
Delegation of the Supreme Court's case selection authority to an
intermediary super court of appeals seems contrary to the
Constitution's provision for "one supreme Court."

65

Constitutional considerations apart, however, delegation of the
Supreme Court's power to screen cases would significantly alter
the function of the Supreme Court in shaping constitutional law.
The power to select cases is a fundamental part of the power to
define the issues and trends in the development of constitutional
and statutory interpretation. 66
Life-tenured Supreme Court Justices bring to the issue-selection
process a variety of backgrounds-judicial, political, and

65

U.S. Const. art. III,

§

1; see Black, supra note 39, at

885-87.

~1~11!;:~~~~~~~
26

academic 67 -an experienced ear attuned to monitoring the
heartbeat of a living Constitution, and a reasoned interaction of
diverse philosophies and interests. M

Because most Justices are

assimilated gradually during extended intervals, the Court
provides continuity, knowledge of trends, and collective
perspective that simply could not be replicated in a panel of
rotating judges with more limited functions and purposes. R

In

selecting cases for review, Justices must weigh not only the
importance of the issues presented, but the timeliness of their
review, the appropriateness of the factual context in which they
arise, the adequacy of representation by counsel, the likely
views of the other Justices on the merits, the reasons why on

67

See infra note 111 and accompanying text.

1

1•1•lllJlll1~
111
•
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27

previous occasions they may have avoided the issues, and the
relationship of the issues presented to issues in other pending
cases and doctrinal developments. ?~

28

The selection of the appropriate time and factual context in
which to address-or readdress-an issue of constitutional or
societal importance is uniquely a function of the Supreme Court.
The decision to grant the petition for certiorari in Baker v.
Carr

72

would not inevitably have been the choice of an

:::]':]:]:]::11::.t#:::1::::: ]~E~p,;~1~t:::±m=:::paiie?;~ J~8F::~: : : :,1 : : H~1~. J~:e:·:~ :t.::
72

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
29

intermediary super court of appeals, given the Supreme Court's
clear direction in Colegrove v. Green

73

that legislative

apportionment was a political matter beyond the province of the
Court. 74

Nor is it clear whether an intermediary supercourt of

appeals would have considered the question of school
desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education 75 worthy of the
Supreme Court's attention, or whether the doctrine of "separate
but equal" in

Plessy v. Ferguson 76 would have resolved the

matter conclusively.

Moreover, three years after the Court had

held in Rummel v. Estelle 77 that the eighth amendment's
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" could not be
invoked to shorten the length of a sentence, it is equally
doubtful that an intermediary court would have thought the Court
would again be interested in reviewing the sentence issue.

73

328 U.S. 549 (1946).

74

Id. at 552; see Black, supra note 39, at 889-91.

75

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

76

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

77

445 U.S. 263 (1980).
30

In

Solem v. Helm, 7 8 however, the Court held that the eighth
amendment proscribes a life sentence without the possibility of
parole for a seventh nonviolent felony. 79

78

103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).

79

Id. at 3013, 3016 •
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31

Efforts to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by
statute or to delegate specific issues for final resolution by an
inferior court-either a permanent new court or a rotating panel

32

of judges-present additional public policy problems.

D.t#!igiF!i6.9Y.$$.
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misapprehend the unique function that the Supreme Court plays in
our constitutional democracy. M

The Supreme Court is not the

final court of errors and appeals.

In the words of the Freund

Committee:
The case which it is the primary duty of the Court to decide are
those that, by hypothesis. present the most fundamental and
difficult issues of law and judgment •••• To maintain the
constitutional order the Court must decide controversies that

111•

33

have sharply divided legislators, lawyers, and the public.

And

in deciding, the Court must strive to understand and elucidate
the complexities of the issues, to give direction to the law, and
to be as precise, persuasive, and invulnerable as possible in its
exposition. 86
The issue is not whether there should be limitations on access to
the Supreme Court; obviously there must be. l!]JlMl~Jjj j Jg9U@iffiJ: :jJ#.~
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The supreme court,

however need not foreclose its power to make important judgments
in certain jurisdictional areas.

Rather, it should retain the

discretion to choose the issues worthy of its review in the
broadest possible jurisdictional environment.
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Report of the Study Group, supra note 35 at 1.
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workload problem is needed, however, which both preserves and
enhances the ability of the Court to perform its core
constitutional responsibilities.

B. An Alternative Proposal
The Supreme Court must be freed from the illusion that it has a
duty to correct every error and resolve every conflict.

At the

same time, the Court needs to identify and resolve legal issues
of fundamental national significance in a clear and consistent
manner.

The proposal outlined below achieves these goals and

35

consists of four interrelated parts.
(1) The Supreme Court's remaining mandatory appellate
jurisdiction should be limited to constitutional cases in which
fundamental human rights raising an issue of nationwide
divisiveness are involved. 87

The Court should be the guardian

of its docket and not be forced by statute to take for argument
and decision any case which it otherwise would determine is not
of prime national importance.
(2) Conflicts among the circuit courts that do not involve issues
worthy of Supreme Court review should be resolved by the affected
circuits without any involvement of the Court.
(3) The Supreme Court should be highly selective in choosing for
review only issues of fundamental national significance.
(4) The Supreme Court should reduce the pressure on its caseload
by discouraging unnecessary litigation (and invitations to

87

Rather than completely eliminating mandatory
jurisdiction, it is preferable to limit it to narrower
circumstances. See American Law Division (Congressional Research
Service) Report on Mandatory Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States 62 (Preliminary Draft June 18,
1982) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
36

unfocused arguments on the part of the bar) through the exercise
of greater judicial restraint, collegial deference, and
disciplined opinion writing by the Justices.
The first and second parts of the proposal are intended to reduce
the flow of cases that the Supreme Court now feels obligated to
review even though they do not involve issues of prime national
importance.
1. Reducing the Number of Cases Presented for Review
It has been estimated that mandatory appeals constitute about 25
percent of the Court' s caseload. 88

Enactment of H. R. 19 6 8 89 and

S.645 90 would replace the Court's remaining mandatory appellate
jurisdiction with discretionary review, thus reducing the number
of cases the Court must review each year. Elimination of
mandatory jurisdiction, except in truly rare situations, is

89

H.R. 1968, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).

90

S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1983) •

37

necessary·ii
=== to complete the conversion of the Supreme Courtstarted by the Act of 1891 92 and accelerated by the Judges' Bill
of 1925 93 -from a final court of errors and appeals to the
ultimate judicial authority on issues of fundamental national
significance.

The one exception to the total elimination of

mandatory jurisdiction, necessary to preserve the core
constitutional responsibility of the Court, would be to mandate
review of those cases in which a lower court has upheld the
constitutionality of a state or federal statute denying
fundamental human rights of a truly divisive national character.
Because the Supreme Court is the ultimate vindicator of such
rights under the Constitution, it would not be consistent with
the Court's constitutional responsibility to avoid such issues

92

Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat.

93

Ch. 229, 43 Stat 936.

826.
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2. Alternatives for Resolving Inter-Circuit Conflicts
The second part of the proposal also reduces the number of cases
that require Supreme Court review.

It simply is not necessary,

in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities for the
Supreme Court to act as an arbitrator among conflicting circuit
courts unless the issues are of fundamental national
significance.

Justice O'Connor has estimated that 23.7 percent

of the Supreme Court's decided cases during her first term
involved "interpretation[s] of statutes on which the lower courts

95

Comments of Justice O'Connor, supra note 7, at 13.
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that another mechanism is needed to resolve these conflicts.
Suggested mechanisms range from the Chief Justice's proposal for
a temporary national panel 98 to Justice White's proposal for a
mandatory en bane hearing. 99
The approach suggested in this Article is a variation on these
proposals, which is designed to augment the underlying theme of
these reforms:

the resolution of legal conflict through
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98

See Annual Report, supra note 1, at 447.

99

See Brennan I, supra note 7, at 232 (quoting Justice
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collegial reason and the search for consensus.

Whenever a

circuit renders a decision that is in conflict with a prior
decision of another circuit, the losing party should be allowed
to petition the court issuing the conflicting opinion for a
rehearing before a panel of seven judges, three from each of the
to circuits which gave rise to the conflict, and a seventh to be
assigned from another circuit by the Chief Justice • 100

Judges

from the two circuits in conflict thus would participate in an en
bane rehearing to resolve the conflict. 101

The decision of the

en bane panel would constitute binding precedent on all circuits,
subject only to discretionary review by the Supreme Court if an
issue of fundamental national importance is presented.

Should a

third circuit fail to follow the precedent established by the

100

The Chief Justice is authorized to "assign temporarily
any circuit judge to act as circuit judge in another circuit." 28
U.S.C. § 29l(a) (1976).
101

Circuit judges are authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
(1976) to sit en bane within a single circuit, but the statute
makes no reference to inter-circuit en bane hearings. Hence.
legislation would be required to effect this portion of the
proposal.
41

inter-circuit en bane hearing, 102 the petitioner could request
an en bane hearing by seven judges, two from each of the three
circuits that had addressed the issue and one assigned by the

102

The decision of the inter-circuit en bane court would be
binding precedent for all other circuits. It is therefore hoped
that the need for the further procedure set forth above would be
rare indeed.

ltJJlftllllllllrE
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The long-term effect of bringing the differing circuit judges
together

would be a greater respect on the part of federal

appellate judges for the precedents of other circuits.

Indeed,

such respect should be encouraged by the Supreme Court through
its rules and decisions.

There are no inherent geographic or

political reasons why federal judges in the thirteen circuits
should apply federal statutes differently in response to local

43

circumstances • 1 0 4

The argument that circuit conflicts help

sharpen the issues for Supreme Court review or provide a testing
ground for various interpretations is, in a word, foolish.

In

any event, such an argument is far outweighed by the injustice,
chaos, and burden of litigation caused by conflicting statutory

These two proposals--if the earlier cited estimates of conflict

104
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See Schaefer, supra note 96, at 454.
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and mandatory jurisdiction cases are correct-could reduce the
number of cases argued before the Court by up to 4 7 percent. 107
3. Concentrating Supreme Court Decision-Making
The third suggestion is, in large measure, an acknowledgment of
what has become a reality.

Since Congress enacted the Judges

Bill of 1925, 108 the Supreme Court has not been expected to take
on the "function • • • of primarily-or even largely-correcting
errors committed by other courts. " 109

The value of Supreme

Court decision making is not in how many individual disputes are
resolved, but rather in the clarity and cohesiveness of the legal
guidance it provides the highest courts of the various states,
the lower federal and state courts and the political branches of
government.

107

See supra notes 88, 95 and accompanying text (25% of the
caseload are cases arising out of mandatory jurisdiction and
23.7% involve inter-circuit conflicts).
108

Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.

llliiill••··--~
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As Congress reacts to media events and special interest pleas,
and as the executive branch is consumed by "crisis-coping" and
"fire-fighting", the importance of a third and independent
branch, committed to reflective reasoning and to a rational
search for sometimes elusive constitutional values increases.

As

Justice Holmes once said:
"The best defense for leaving fundamental responsibilities to
this Court came from Brandeis • • • that constitutional
restrictions enable a man to sleep at night and know that he
won't

be robbed before morning--which, in days of legislative

activity and general scheming, otherwise, he scarcely would feel
sure about. 110

Letter from o.w. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter, Holmes
Papers, Harvard Law School (April 20, 1921) (quoted in A. Bickel,
The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 28 (1970))
[hereinafter cited as A. Bickel I].
110
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No Plimsoll line can be established which helps the Court to
discharge its difficult responsibilities.

With many of the

issues with which it deals-for example, due process, just
compensation, equal protection-the Court is left with the need
for intuitive judgment.

According to Justice Powell, however,

simply coping with the rising caseload may require a Justice
during the busy opinion writing months of May and June to work
"twelve to fifteen hours a day, six days [a] week." 116

Such a

schedule simply is not conducive to quiet reflection or sound

;:w;;;;::==~=-*
116

Powell, supra note 7, at 1372
48

judgment. 117

The answer is not to relegate the Justices like

too man senators and cabinet officers, to the role of mangers of
an ever-expanding staff • 118

Rather, the Court should limit the

number of cases that it decides on the merits each year to a
manageable number, allowing sufficient time for discussion,
common sense,reflection and clarity of presentation.

As Justice

Stevens has noted, the Supreme Court's caseload could be reduced
significantly by stricter adherence to the doctrine of judicial
restraint. 119

Very simply, if it is not necessary to decide the

issue-if the issue is not ripe for review-the Court should not
undertake to decide it, for as Alexander Bickel said, "[n]o

117

Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Forward: The Time
Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 99-100 (1959).
118

Justice Brandeis once observed: "The reason the public
thinks so much of the Justices of the Supreme Court is that they
are almost the only people in Washington who do their own work."
C. Wyzanski, Whereas-A Judge's Premises 61 (1965) (remark of
Justice Brandeis) (quoted in Remarks of Justice Rehnquist, supra
note 10, at 27).
119

Stevens II, supra note 47, at 180; see Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 345-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J. concurring).
49

answer is what the wrong question begets."

120

120
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A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 103 (1962).

50

51

Another type of case that the Supreme Court need not review
involves issues limited to a specific geographical area.
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Cases which are factually unique also need not be reviewed.

53

$ii

54

should be a uniquely crafted work of art; even the dissenting
views, like contrasting colors and off-setting shadows, should
contribute to the clarity and

vitality of the whole.

It is

hoped the Court's archetypes wuould tend more toward the harmony
of Monet and clarity of Rembrandt than the harried spontaneity of
Pollock or discordance of Kandinsky.

4. Collegial Analsis: Reaching a Consensus
The most significant opportunity to reduce the Supreme Court's
caseload may ultimately be through disciplined opinion writing
and collegial deference in the rendering of decisions.

In

selecting cases for review, the Court should consider whether
members of the Court are prepared to work together to clarify and
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advance the state of the law.

The subtle judgments and mutual

deference involved in this process spring from the Court's deeply
embedded traditions and the pract ical wisdom of its finest
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The unpublished opinions of Justice Brandeis, as analyzed by
Alexander Bickel, provide useful insight into the collegial
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decision-making of past Courts and the judgment involved in
deciding whether to dissent. 137

Brandeis had been assigned to

write the Court's opinion in St. Louis Iron Mountain

Southern

Railway Co. v. Starbird, 138 concerning the question whether the
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review a state court's decision
if a federal right had not been expressly asserted in the state
court below.

Brandeis wrote a draft opinion denying

jurisdiction, but several months later Justice Day issued a
unanimous opinion for the Court finding jurisdiction and
addressing the merits. Why did Brandeis not dissent? Bickel
asserts that Brandeis "suppressed his dissenting views on
questions which he considered to be of no great consequence." 139

137

See A. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice
Brandeis passim (1957)[hereinafter cited as A. Bickel II].
138

243 U.S. 592 (1917).

139

A. Bickel II, supra note 137, at 28.

57

"suppressed dissents for tactical
reasons" 143 and often "referred to Holmes' reluctance to dissent

58

again after he had once had his say on a subject. 144

The Court

has often performed magnificently in adjusting the views of its
members to avoid dissension on great public issues, particularly
when unanimity was important to gain public acceptance.

The

nation should greatly admire and appreciate the effort, time and
talent which was expended in fashioning a single Court opinion
in, inter alia, Brown v. Board of

Education,~

Brown v. Board

of Education II, 146 Cooper v. Aaron, 147 Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 148 United States v. Nixon, 149
and in achieving near-unanimity (8-1) in Bob Jones University v.
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144

A. Bickel II, supra note 137, at 18.

146

349 U.S. 294 (1955).

147

358 U.S. 1 (1959).

1 48

402 U.S. 1 (1971).

149

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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United States. 150
While these cases demonstrate that the Court sometimes has
struggled mightily for consensus, there is little public
indication that the traditional spirit of collegial deference
pervades the Court today.

150

103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).

60

The Court, however, must confront "that 'great difficulty of all
group action'-when to dissent, and when to concede and be
silent. " 154

,,.,,,,,,

While concurring opinions may contribute to the
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views and lack of cohesion erode the Court's moral authority,
befuddle the beneficiaries of its guidance, and-most relevant
here- invite further pressure on its workload.
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Perhaps the classic example of fragmentation occurred in Regents
of the University of Califorllia v. Bakke. 1 8 5

To different

five-to-four majorities decided the two main issues in the
case, 1 86 resulting in six separate opinions. 1 8 7

Even though
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438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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1 87

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) Opinion of Powell. J •• at 269; opinion of Brennan, J.,
Marshall, J., White, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, at 324; opinion of White, J., at 379; opinion
of Marshall. J •• at 387; opinion of Blackmun, J., at 402; opinion
69

Justices Marshall, White and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan in
his opinion, they each also wrote their on separate opinions. 188
The resultant 156 pages left the law regarding affirmative action
in medical school admissions in a state of reasoned ambiguity.

of Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, at
408) •
188

See supra note 187.

70

71

72

There are, of course, times when a clear and forceful dissent
contribute greatly to public understanding of the law. but
d i ssents should be saved for such occasions.

One should not

advocate that the fiercely independent intellects that constitute
toda's Supreme Court consign themselves to the lowest common
denominator of compromise.

Nor should attempts at accommodation

resort to intentional ambiguities like the legislative
ambiguities created by House-Senate conferences.

If clarity and

candor are best served by dissenting opinions, then a dissent is
preferabl e to d i s i ngenuous accommodation.
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CONCLUSION
It is truly ironic for one who feels so deeply that the Court has
consistently discharged its constitutional responsibility with
more judgment, style and foresight than any other institution of
government to suggest any criticism whatsoever.

When the

President and Congress avoided the issues, the Court had the
courage and foresight to end racial segregation in the public
school system, to come to grips with the right of a woman to have
an abortion, to recognize that sex discrimination is unacceptable
in a consti tut ional democracy, and to insist upon a fair criminal
process.

Anyone who knows Ameri can history must concede that the
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Court has performed with a higher standard of excellence than any
other institution, state or federal, in this constitutional
democracy.

The libraries at Oxford, Cambridge and Harvard

undoubtedly contain more critical theses about Shakespeare or
Pushkin than any minor writers or poets; the Court must accept
the fact that institutions that excel are the subject of
continuing critical pressure to attain even greater standards of
excellence-perhaps because they are the repository of so many of
civilized society's aspirations.

In that spirit this conclusion

is written.
Much of the answer to the workload problem lies not in the
establishment of new institutions but deep in the traditions of
the Supreme Court.

Congress should give the Court discretion to

choose only those few issues of fundamental national importance
for review, delegating to the circuit courts the power to resolve
lesser conflicts.

Like a microcosm of the larger society it

reflects, the Supreme Court's success depends on it taking those
limited issues and weaving the diverse strands of a complex
77

society into a cohesive fabric.

Thus, the ultimate objective in

the management of the Supreme Court's caseload should be to
provide the Justices with the freedom to grapple together as
wise individualists in search of common principles rooted in the
unfulfilled vision of our Constitution.

It is a disciplined

search which cautions against needless dissent and pointless
contention.

As Alexander Biekel has said, society "values the

capacity of the judges to draw its attention to issues of largest
principle that may have gone unheeded in the welter of its
pragmatic doings • 199

199

A. Bickel, supra note 110, at 177.
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